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ABSTRACT
AN EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 
IN THE LIGHT OF DELORS REPORT
By
AHMET CEM SEN 
MBA Thesis
Bilkent University - Ankara 
May , 1990
Supervisor : Prof. Gökhan ÇAPOGLU
This research analyzes the European Econosic and Monetary 
Union in the light of Delors Report and it consists of two main 
parts.
The first part of the thesis summarizes the Delors Report . In 
the first section ,in Part I, the past and present developments in 
the economic and monetary integration of the European Community is 
briefly discussed in chronological order. In the second section the 
principle features of both an economic and monetary union is 
studied separetely and finally the points of the Delors three stage 
plan is given in the third section.
In Part II, an evaluation of European Economic and Monetary 
Union is given in the light of Delors Stages and it is concluded 
that it is inappropriate to schedule the later phases of European 
Economic and Monetary Union prior to gaining experience from 
implementation of the previous phases.
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ÖZET
AVRUPA e k o n o m i k VE PARASAL b İr l İg İn İN 
DELORS RAPORU IŞIĞINDA DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ
Hazırlayan
, AHMET CEM SEN
İşletme Yüksek Lisans Tezi 
Biİkent Üniversitesi - Ankara
Mayıs , 1990
Tez Yöneticisi : Dr. Gökhan ÇAPOĞLU
Bu araştırma Avrupa Ekonomik ve Parasal Birliğini Delors 
RapHsru işigi altında incelemektedir ve iki ana bolümden 
oluşmaktadır.
Tezin birinci bolumu Delors Raporunu özetlemektedir Bölüm 
I'in birinci kısmında Avrupa ekonomik ve parasal entegrasyonunun 
geçmişteki ve günümüzdeki gelişmeleri kronolojik bir sıra içersinde
Ikısaca tartışılmıştır. ikinci kısimda ekonomik ve parasal 
birliklerin temel özellikleri üzerinde ayrı ayrı çalişilmls ve son 
olarak uçuncû kısımda Delors Komitesinin uç aşamalı plani 
verilmiştir.
Bolum Il’de Delors*un planının ışığı altında Avrupa Ekonomik 
ve Parasal Birliğinin bir değerlendirilmesi verilmiş ve Önceki 
evrelerin uygulanması sırasındaki tecrübeleri kazanmadan ilerideki 
evrelerin programlanmasının uygun olmayacağı sonucuna varılmiştır.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT................................................ iv
OZET..................................................... V
INTRODUCTION............................................. 1
PART I WHAT IS DELORS REPORT?................................... 2
1.1 Past And Present Developments In Economic And Monetary
Integration In The European Community................... 3
1.1.1 The Objective Of Economic and Monetary Union.......3
1.1.2 The European Monetary System and The ECU...........4
1.1.3 The Single European Act and The Internal Market
Programme....................................... 6
1.2 The Final Stage Of Economic And Monetary Union......... 8
1.2.1 General Considerations.............................. 8
1.2.2 The Principal Features of Monetary Union........... 9
1.2.3 The Principal Features Of Economic Union.......... 11
1.2.4 Institutional Arrangements........   14
1.3 Steps Towards Economic And Monetary Union............... 16
1.3.1 Principles Governing A Step-By-Step Approach......16
1.3.2 The Stages Proposed In DELORS Report.............. 18
1.3.3 The ECU............................................. 22
Yl
PART II AN OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN THE
LIGHT OF DELORS· STAGES................................ 24
II. 1 The Internal Market....................................25
11.1.1 Implication & Results Of Free Movement Of Goods And
Services............................................26
II. 1.1.a Monopoly, Competition and Mergers............ 26
Il.l.l.b Taxation...................................... 28
11.1.2 Implication & Results Of Free Capital Movement.... 29
11.2 The European Central Bank............................. 31
11.2.1 The Key Role Of Price Stability....................33
11.3 The ECU................................................ 35
11.3.1 The ECU : As A Common Currency.....................35
11.3.2 The ECU : Its Private Use.......................... 37
11.3.3 The ECU : As A Parallel Currency...................39
11.4 Political Will......................................... 40
II. 5 Budget Policy: No Inflation Deficit Financing......... 43
11.6 Structural Funds.......................................44
11.7 Regional Policy and Capital Market....................45
11.8 Monetarist and Economists - Parallelism............. 45
11.9 EMU : With Some Or All Member States Participated... 46
11.10 Preparatory Period : No Three-Stage System........... 47
11.11 Social Aspects......................................... 47
CONCLUSION.............................................. 49
REFERENCES.............................................. 51
VII
INTRODUCTION
Economic and monetary union in Europe would imply complete 
freedom of movement for persons, goods, services and capital, as 
well as irrevocally fixed exchange rates between national 
currencies , and finally a single currency. This, in turn, would 
imply a common monetary policy and require a high degree of 
compatibility of economic policies and consistency in a number of 
other policy areas, particularly in the fiscal field. These 
policies would trigger price stability, compatibility in growth 
rates, converging standarts of living, high employment and external 
equilibrium. Economic and monetary union would represent the final 
result of the process of progressive economic integration in 
Europe.
Since many powers are to be transfered by the EC countries to 
the Community institutions (European Parliament, European 
Council) under the DELORS Reports proposals, its acceptance may 
constitute a cornerstone for the member countries.
The Report proposes a step-by-step approach which converts the 
European Community in three successive stages into a unique 
economic and monetary union. This union will based on a common 
monetary policy and a single currency under the supervision of a 
European Central Banking System (ESCB) and maximum compatibility 
between the national economic policies.
A  R  X
UHAT IS DELORS REPORT ?
1.1 PAST AND PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ECONOMIC AND 
MONETARY INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY *
In this section, the past and present developments in the 
economic and the monetary integration of the Eurof>ean Community (EC) 
is briefly discussed in choronological order in the light of DELORS 
Report.
1.1.1 The Objective Of Economic and Monetary Union
In the late 1960's the Bretton Woods system was showing signs 
of decline. In the Hague meeting in 1969, the Heads of State and 
Government agreed on an idea of creation of an economic and 
monetary union within the European Community. Then, in 1970 the 
Werner Report presented a plan for the attainment of economic and 
monetary union. After the Werner Report in March 1971, the member 
states expressed "their political will to establish an economic and 
monetary union" which was expected to lead a better economic 
performance in the union by alleviating the speculative movements, 
increasing the intra-community trade, allocating the capital 
production factors optimally and making possible the use of mutual 
assistance between the participants.
Several important moves followed: In 1972 the "snake" was 
created; in 1973 the European Monetary Co-operation Fund (EMCF) was 
set up; and in 1974 the Council Decision on the attainment of a 
high degree of convergence in the Community and the Directive on 
stability, growth and full employment were adopted. But, by the
(*) Sections I,II,III heavily depend on DELORS Report
mid-1970s due to the diverging policy responses to the economic 
shocks of that period, the process of integration had lost its 
speed.
In 1979 the process of monetary integration was relaunched 
with the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) and 
European Currency Unit (ECU).
1.1.2 The European Monetary System and the ECU
The European Monetary System was introduced in 1979 following 
the discussions between the governments of the member states of the 
EEC. The EMS aims (1) forming a monetary union; (2) ensuring 
fluctuations among the member currencies to a Tiarrow margin; (3) 
ensuring the regional interconvertibilty among the currencies; (4) 
making the use of a common currency unit among the member 
countries. But its* immediate aim was to create a zone of exchange 
rate stability,so member states agreed to intervene in the foreign 
exchange markets to limit the extent to which their currencies 
fluctuated against those of other member states. Consequently the 
exchange rate mechanism have succeeded in creating a zone of 
increasing monetary stability.
The exchange rate constraints has greatly helped those 
participating countries with relatively high rates of inflation for 
converging to low interest rates and attaining a high degree of 
exchange rate stability as can be observed from figure 1.
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helped moderate cost increases in many
countries and has lead to an improvement in overall economic
performance.
At the sane time the EMS has not fulfilled its full potential. 
Firstly, a number of community countries have not yet joined the 
exchange rate mechanism and one country participates with wider 
fluctuation margins. Secondly, the lack of sufficient convergence 
of fiscal policies leads to a large and permanent budget 
deficits in certain countries has remained a source of tensions. 
Thirdly, the establishment of the European Monetary Fund, as 
foreseen by the Resolution of the European Council adopted in 1978, 
have not been accomplished (6).
The ECU is defined as a basket type currency consisting of a 
certain combination of the currencies of ten EEC countries. In 
launching the EMS, the Europ>ean Council declared in 1978 that "a 
European Currency Unit (ECU) will be at the center of the EMS". ECU 
is used both as the numeraire of the exchange rate mechanism and 
dominate operations in intervention and credit mechanism, but it 
also serves as a reserve asset and a means of settlement for EMS 
central banks. The ECU has gained considerable popularity in the 
market place. Its use as a denominator for financial transactions 
has spread significantly. In international bond market the ECU has 
achieved the position of the third most used currency in the 
Euromarkets, coming a head of currencies such as pound sterling and 
the guilder. There were 127 ECU issues in the Eurobond market worth 
of $ 7 billion and accounting for over 6 percent of the market 
share (16).
ECU-denominated deposits by the non-bank sector have stagnated 
since 1985, suggesting that the ECU's appeal as a near money 
substitute and store of liquidity is modest. In addition, in the 
non-financial sphere the use of the ECU for the invoicing and 
settlement of commercial transactions has remained limited, 
covering at only 1^ of the Community countries' external trade.
1.1.3 The Single European Act and Internal Market Programme 
The EMS has been successful in promoting the internal and 
external monetary stability. So this has contributed in a further 
progress in recent years such as, in 1985 the internal market 
programme was adopted and the Single European Act is signed. In
January 1985 the Comraision proposed a market without internal 
frontiers by the end of 1992. The detailed measures for the removal 
of physical, technical and fiscal barriers were set out in a White 
Paper. This paper studied the methods for creating a unified 
economic area in which persons, goods, services and capital would 
be able to move freely. This objective was embodied in the Single 
European Act in December 1985.
The Single European Act introduced four important changes in the 
Community's strategy for improving the integration process. 
Firstly, it greatly simplified the requirements of harmonising 
national law by adoption of mutual recognition of national norms 
and requlations. Secondly, it established a faster and more 
efficient decision-making process by extending the scope of 
qualified majority voting. Thirdly, it gave the European Parliament 
a greater role in the legislative process. Fourtly, it approved the 
need to strengthen the Community’s economic and social cohesion, to 
reinforce the Community's scientific and technological base, to 
harmonise working conditions with respect to health and safety 
standarts and to iniciate action to protect the enviroment. 
{Point 8) (*)
Considerable progress has been made in implementing the 
internal market programme over the last years. Eight member 
countries have decided that they will fully liberalize capital 
movements by 1st July 1990 and that the other member countries will 
follow them after a period of transition.
(·) Direct Quotation from Delors Report page:8
There is indeed a broad support of consumers and producers to 
the Single European Act, so these people make their economic 
decisions according to the prospects of 1992. As a result , the 
anticipation of a market without internal frontiers has generated a 
new dynamism and has contributed to the recent acceleration of 
economic growth in the Community.
1.2 THE FINAL STAGE OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 
The second part of the DELORS Report studies the principal 
features of both an economic and monetary union separately, and the 
institutional arrangements are also discussed for the healthy 
functioning of the union. But before these discussions , some 
general considerations about the final stage of economic and 
monetary union will be given.
1.2.1 General Considerations
The Community would continue to consist of individual nations 
with different economic, social, cultural and political
characteristics even after attaining economic and monetary union.
So the existance and preservation of this ’’plurality” would require 
a degree of autonomy in economic decision-making. For this reason 
in point 17 it is indicated that it would not be possible simply to 
follow the example of existing federal states; but it would 
necessary to develop an innovative and unique approach.
In the economic field a wide range of decisions would remain 
to national and regional autorities. However, given their potential 
impact on the overall domestic and external economic situation of
B
the Community and their Implications for the conduct of a common 
monetary policy, such decisions would have to be placed within an 
agreed macro-economic framework and be subject to binding 
procedures and rules. This would permit the determination of an 
overall policy for the Community as a whole and place binding 
constrain VÎ on the size and the financing of‘ budget deficits.
Point 21 in the DELORS Report states that economic union and 
monetary union would have to be implemented in parallel because 
they form two integral parts of a single whole. The’ description 
begins with monetary union because the principal features of an 
economic union depend significantly on the agreed monetary 
arrangements and constraints.
1.2.2 ■ The Fhrincipal Features Of Monetary Union 
A monetary union constitutes a currency area in which policies 
are managed jointly with a view to attaining common macro-economic 
objectives. According to the Werner Report there ere three 
necessary conditions for a monetary union : (i) the assurance of 
total and irreversible convertibility of currencies; (ii) the 
complete liberalisation of capital transactions and full 
integration of banking and other financial markets; (iii) the 
elimination of margins of fluctuation and the irrevocable locking 
of exchange rate parities.
The first requirement have already been met and the second cne 
will be met with the completion of the internal market programme. 
The third and the most important condition for a monetary union 
would be fulfilled only when the decisive step will be taken to 
lock exchange rates irrevocably. As a result of this step’, national
currencies would become increasingly close substitutes and their 
interest rates would tend to converge.
The fullfilment of the above mentioned three conditions would 
not be the end of the process of a monetary unification in the 
Community. They are only requirements for a single currency area. 
The adoption of a single currency might be seen as a natural and 
desirable further development of the monetary union. A single 
currency would clearly demonstrate the irreversibility of the move 
to monetary union. It will facilitate the monetary management of 
the Community and avoid the transaction costs of converting 
currencies. The replacement of national currencies by a single 
currency should therefore take place as soon as posible after the 
locking of parities (6).
Once permanently fixed exchange rates are adopted, there 
would be a need for a common monetary policy, which would be 
carried out through new operating procedures. The co-ordination of 
many national monetary policies would not be sufficient. The 
responsibility for the single monetary policy would have to be 
given to a new centralized institution. In the new institution 
collective decisions would be taken on the supply of money and 
credit as well as on other instruments of monetary policy, 
including interest rates. This shift from national monetary 
policies to a single monetary policy ,as a principal institutional 
change , is an inescapable consequence of monetary union.
The decision to fix exchange rates permanently, the full 
liberalisation of capital movements , and financial market 
integration will create a situation in which the co-ordination of
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monetary рюИсу will have to be strengthened progressively. For 
example every banking institution in the Community is free to 
accept deposits from any customer in the Community and in any of 
the national currencies. So there would be a possibility of loosing 
the area in which its currency is used and the area in which its 
banking system operates. In these circumstances the effectiveness 
of national monetary policies will become increasingly dependent on 
co-operation among central banks. Indeed, the growing co-ordination 
of monetary policies will make a positive contribution to financial 
market integration and will help central banks gain the experience 
that would be necessary to move a single monetary policy.(Point 24)
1.2.3 The Principle Features Of Economic Union 
In defining specific rules and arrangements governing an 
economic union, the Community should be guided by two
considerations. Firstly, the economic union should be based on the 
same market-oriented economic priciples that underlie the economic 
order of its member countries. Secondly, an appropriate balance 
between the economic and monetary components would have to be 
ensured for the union to be viable. According to DELORS Report 
Economic union can be described in terms of four basic elements: 
(i) the single market within which persons, goods, services and 
capital can move freely; (ii) competition policy and other measures 
aimed at strengthening market mechanism; (iii) common policies 
aimed at structural change and regional development (iv) macro- 
economic policy co-ordination, including binding rules for
budgetary policies.
11
Single Market: It is disscused in Section 1.1.3 .
Competition policy : For implementing the competition policy the 
market would have to operate in such a way that entering to 
markets would not be impeded and market functioning would not be 
distorted by the behaviour of private or public economic agents. 
Besides the use of government subsidies to assist particular 
industries should be strictly forbidden because they distort 
competition and cause an inefficient use and allocation of scarce 
economic resources.
Community Policies In The Regional And Structural Field: In an 
economic union it would be necessary to promote an optimum 
allocation of resources and to spread welfare gains throughout the 
Community. The economic union would be faced with serious economic 
and political risks if enough consideration were not given to 
regional imbalances . For this reason particular attention would 
have to be given at narrowing regional and structural disparities 
and promoting a balanced development throughout the Community. 
Economic and monetary integration may have beneficial effects on 
the less developed regions of the Community. For example, regions 
with lower wagelevels would have an opportinity to attract modern 
and rapidly growing service and manufacturing industries for which 
the choice of location would not necessarily be determii^ed by 
transport costs, labor skills and market proximity. In point 29 it 
is stated that the principal objective of regional policies should 
not be to subsidise incomes and simply to offset inequalities in 
standarts of living, but to help equalise production conditions 
through , investment programmes such as investment in physical
12
infrastructure, communications, transportation and education so 
the large-scale movements of labor do not become major adjustment 
factor. But indeed wage flexibility and labor mobility are also 
necessary to eliminate differences in competitiveness in different 
regions and countries of the Community. It might be necessary in 
certain circumstances to provide financing flows through official 
channels just for the adjustment of burdens temporarily. 
Macro-Economic Policy: Macro-economic policy co-ordination is the
fourth area which would be necessary for a viable economic and 
monetary union. The role of the Community would clearly identified 
in promoting price stability and economic growth through the 
co-ordination of economic policies. In general in macro-economic 
field, the short-term and mediun-term economic developments in the 
Community would need to be agreed periodically then these 
agreements would form the framework for a better co-ordination of 
national economic policies.
As the uncoordinated and divergent national budgetary 
policies would generate imbalances in the real and financial 
sectors of the Community , the DELORS Report mentions the 
requirement of some binding rules. They are as follows: Firstly, by 
taking into consideration of each member country's situation, 
effective upper limits on budget deficits of individual member 
countries of the Community would be imposed. Secondly, access to 
direct central bank credit and other forms of monetary financing 
would be prevented while permitting open market operations in 
government securities. Thirdly,the external borrowing in non- 
Comraunity currencies would be limited.
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The DELORS Report also states that the Community would need to 
be in a positon to monitor its overall economic situation and 
assess the consistency of developments in individual countries with 
regard to common objectives. Then the Community should be able to 
formulate the guidelines for the new policies.
1.2.4 Institutional Arrangements 
Management of the economic and monetary union would need an 
institutional framework which would allow policy to be decided and 
executed at the Community level. These policies would be in those 
economic areas that were of direct relevence for the functioning of 
the union. Economic and monetary union would require the creation 
of a new monetary institution placed in the constellation of 
Community institutions (European Parliament, European Council, 
Council of Ministers, Commission and Court of Justice). The 
domestic and international monetary policy-making of the Community 
should be organised in a federal form, in what might be called a 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The ESCB would take the 
advantages of making existing central banks part of a new 
system (6). At the final stage the ESCB would be responsible for 
formulating and implementing monetary policy as well as managing 
the Community's exchance rate policy vis-a-vis third currencies. 
According to the guidelines established by the Council of the ESCB 
and the instructions from the central institution, the national 
central banks would be entrusted with the implementation.
u
The European System of Central Banks characteristics is given 
in Point 32:
Mandate and Functions
- the System would be committed to the objective of price 
stability;
- the System should support the general economic policy set at the 
Community level ;
- the System would be responsible for the formulation and 
implementation of monetary policy, exchange rate and reserve 
management. Besides , the maintenance of a prop>erly functioning 
payment system would be in its responsibility;
- the System would participate in the co-ordination of banking 
supervision policies Of the supervisory authorities;
- the System could buy and sell government securities on the market 
as a means of conducting monetary policy.
Structure and Organisation
- a federative structure, since this would correspond best to the 
political diversity of the Community;
- establishment of an ESCB Council (composed of the Governers of 
the central banks and the members of the Board, the latter to be 
appointed by the European Council) . This Council would be 
resposible for the formulation of and decisions on the thrust of 
monetary policy;
- establishment of a Board (with supporting staff).This Board would 
monitor monetary developments and oversee the implementation of the 
common monetary policy;
- national central banks which would execute operations in
15
accordance with the decisions taken by the ESCB Council.
Status
- independence: the ESCB Council should be independent of
instructions from national governments and Community authorities. 
This sould be maintained by giving appropriate security of tenure 
to the members of the ESCB Council;
- accountability: reporting would be in the form of submission of
an annual report by the ESCB to the European Parliament and the 
European Council. Supervision of the administration of the System 
would be carried out independently of the Community 
bodies.(»)
1.3 STEPS TOWARDS ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION
After defining the main features of an economic and monetary 
union, the DELORS Committee has undertaken the "task of studying 
and proposing concrete stages leading towards the union". Under the 
light of the principle features of economic and monetary union, 
which are mentioned in sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3, and the principles 
governing a step-by-step approach , which will be described below, 
the DELORS Committee proposes a three stage plan in the third part 
of its’ report.
1.3.1 Principles Governing A Step-By-Step Approach 
Discrete But Evolutionary Steps: The process of implementing
economic and monetary union would have to be divided into a limited 
number of clearly defined stages and the beginning of each stage (*)
(*) See Point 33 at page 15 which would determine the areas in 
which decision taking auhority would be .transferred from the 
national to the Community level in detail.
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would necessitate new arrangements. These new arrangements would 
gradually develop their effects and bring about a change in 
economic circumstances in order to pass for the next stage. Each 
stage would have to represent a significant change with respect to 
the preceeding one.
Parallelism: Parallel advancement in economic and monetary 
integration would be inevitable in order to avoid imbalances . If 
parallelism between monetary and economic integration is not 
satisfied the imbalances can cause economic strains and loss of 
political support for developing the Community further into an 
economic and monetary union.
Calender: The conditions for moving from stage to stage cannot be 
defined precisely in advance. Therefore it is not advised to set 
explicit deadlines for each stage by the DELORS Committee 
especially for the passage from stage one to stage two and most 
importantly, to the move to irrevocably fixed exchange 
rates(Point43). However, there should be a clear indication of the 
timing of the first stage. It should start no later than 1st July 
1990 when the the full liberalisation of capital movements will be 
fulfilled.
Participation: Although some of the members have participated fully 
in all aspects of the Community from the beginning, some of members 
have not. So a consensus on the final objectives of the Community 
should be maintained, while allowing for a degree of flexibility 
concerning the date and conditions on which some member countries 
would join certain arrangements.
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1.3.2 The Stages Proposed In DELORS Report 
There are three stages proposed by DELORS Committee which will 
be discussed one by one as follows;
STAGE 1
The first stage is the initiation of the process of creating 
an economic and monetary union. It would aim at a greater 
convergence of economic performance through the strengthening of 
economic and monetary policy co-ordination with the existing 
institutional framework.
Economic Arrangements
* complete removal of physical, technical and fiscal barriers 
within the Community in line with the internal market programme;
* the creation of the Structural Funds and doubling of budgetary 
resources for promoting regional development and correcting 
economic imbalances;
* there should be a reform, like 197A Directive on economic 
convergence, which would strengthen the power of Member States for 
a co-ordinated implementation of economic and budgetary policies; 
Monetary Arrangements
* the same rules should apply to all the members who are in the 
EMS;
* all restrictions toward the private use of ECU should be removed;
* all monetary and financial instruments should circulate freely;
* there should be stonger powers for the Committee Of Central Bank 
Governors which would be entitled to make recommendation;
DELORS Committee could express majority opinions, although at 
this stage they would not be binding. In order to make its policy
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co-ordination function more effective, the Committee would set up 
three sub-committees —  a monetary policy committee, a foreign 
exchange policy committee, an advisory committee -- with a greater 
research and advisory role and with a permanent research staff.(·) 
Besides the discussions about economic and monetary fields, 
the DELORS Committee members also states their opinion on "European 
Reserve Fund" (ERM) which is suggested to be created in stage one. 
Some of the members of the Committee supported the creation of a 
European Reserve Fund. The main objectives of the ERF are;
- to serve as a training ground for implementing a better co­
ordination of monetary analysis and decisions;
- to faciliate the possiblity of intervention (in third and 
participating currencies) on the foreign exchange market at the 
request of the participating central banks;
- to be the symbol of the political will of the European countries 
and thus reinforce the credibility of the process toward economic 
and monetary union.(Point 53)
The resources of the Fund would be provided by the pooling of 
a limited amount of reserves (for instance 10% at the beginning) 
from participating central banks.
The other members of the Committee felt that the creation of 
the ERF was not suitable at this stage. Their objection arises due 
to the following considerations:
- common interventions by such a Fund cannot be a subsitute for 
economic adjustment to adjust imbalances within the Community;
(*) See Point 52 in page 19 in DELORS Report for the functions of 
those three committees
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- if it were given enough power some functions of the Fund could be 
performed by the Committee of Governors; thus there is no need to 
set up a new institution immediately;
- according to these members the co-ordination of intervention 
policies is essential rather than the technique of common 
interventions.
STAGE 2
The second stage should start with the EEC Treaty. In this 
stage the basic organs and structure of the economic and monetary 
union would be set up, involving both revision of existing 
institutions and the establishment of new ones. The institutional 
framework would gradually take over operational functions and serve 
both as the center for monitoring and analysing macro-economic 
developments but also promote a process of common decision making. 
Stage two must be seen as a period of transition to the final 
stage. This would thus primarily constitute a training process 
leading to collective decision making. At this stage responsibility 
for policy decisions would be left to national authorities.
Economic Arrangements
■ if necessary, the implementation of the programme for 
completing the Single Market should be reinforced;
* The European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the Monetary 
Committee, and the European Commission would be reinforced in order 
to assess the progress of the convergence of national economies and 
to evaluate the performance of structural and regional policies.
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Monetary Arrangements
The set up of ESCB would be the most important feature of this 
stage. The ESCB would include the previously existing institutional 
monetary arrangements (the EMCF, the Committee of Central Bank 
Governors, the sub-committees for monetary policy analysis, foreign 
exchange policy and the permanent secretarial). The key task of 
ESCB during this stage would be to begin the transition from the 
co-ordination of the independent national monetary policies by the 
Committee of Central Bank Governors in stage one. The DELORS Report 
points to the difficulties in gradually transferring monetary 
powers to the ESCB so proposes the following monetary arrangements:
* inviting national authorities to set in motion their monetary 
policy in accordance with the ESCB;
* pooling a certain amount of reserves to finance interventions in 
the financial markets;
* introducing narrower fluctuation margins if progress in 
converging national economies is sufficient;
STAGE 3
The DELORS Report proposes the following arrangements in 
third stage.
Economic Arrangements
* the EEC’s structural and regional policies would be reinforced, 
which would necessitate for greater budgetary resources;
* the EEC Council of Ministers would have the power to make 
decisions concerning the budgetary policies of the Member States 
with the aim of attaining some degree of stability and meeting the
21
needs of the structural adjustment policy;
* the Community would utilize its full authority in the process 
of national policy co-operation;
Monetary Arrangements
* exchange rates for EEC currencies would be irrevocably fixed 
and monetary policy responsibilities would be transferred to the 
ESCB;
* government reserves would be pooled and managed by the ESCB;(*)
* the introduction of a single common EEC currency would take 
place during this stage;
1.3.3 The ECU
Finally in the third part of the report the DELORS Committee 
investigated various aspects of the role that the ECU might play in 
the process of economic and monetary integration in Europe. Firstly 
the Committee reached to the opinion that the ECU has the potential 
to be developed into a common currency. This would imply that the 
ECU would be transformed from a basket of currencies into a real 
currency.
Secondly, the Committee considered the possibility of adopting 
a parallel currency strategy { ECU will be issued as a real
currency in addition to the existing Comunity currencies in order 
to compete with them) as a means of accelerating the process of 
moving to a monetary union. Under this approach the definition of 
the ECU as a basket of currencies would be abandoned at an early 
stage. The proponents of this strategy expect that ECU will
(*) See Point 60 in DELORS Report for the responsibilities of ESCB 
at the final stage
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gradually crowd-out national currencies and this would make it 
possible to overcome the institutional and economic difficulties of 
establishing a monetary union. DELORS Committee felt that this 
strategy should not be recommended for two main reasons. (1) An 
additional source of money creation without a precise linkage to 
economic activity could negatively effect price stability. (2) The 
addition of a new currency, with its own independent monetary 
implications would further violate the efforts for co-ordinating 
different national policies.(PointA?)
Thirdly, the Committee examined the possibility of using the 
official ECU as an instrument to conduct of a common monetary 
policy.
Fourtly, the Committee agreed that there should be no 
discrimination against the private use of the ECU and they decided 
to remove the existing administrative obstacles.{Point 49)
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F> A R T I I
AN OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 
IN THE LIGHT OF THE DELORS* STAGES
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II.1 The Internal Market
During 1970's Europe showed a poor performance compared to its 
competitors Japan and U.S.A.. The major reasons for this poor 
performance can be summarized as folows:
* the fragmentation of the Community into twelve domestic markets, 
separated from one another by frontiers and frontier controls;
* different rules and requlations were dominated for each of the 
member countries relating to both goods and services;
* monopolistic and anti-competitive policies were followed by 
public and private bodies.
Consequently the Internal Market programme was relaunched 
inorder to sweep away all these barriers, to enable the Community 
to operate as a single entity and, to develop the full strength of 
its population of 320 million. Thirty years later the Theaty of 
Rome was signed, Europe was now close to the achievement of the 
first great objective of that Treaty, namely the creation of a 
Single European Market in which persons, goods, services and 
capital will be able move freely.
Paolo Cecchini made a study about the results of the Internal 
Market. His study shows that the completion of the Internal Market 
will increase the national income of the Community by S%, reduce 
prices by 6% and create 2-5 million new jobs. The reasons for such 
an optimism are: (1) oil prices have declined, (2) Europe have 
digested the new costs for the enviroment, <3) the inflation rates 
converged to low levels, (<4) return on investment in Europe is no 
longer below what firms can earn from investing in financial 
assets (4). So due to the above reasons Cecchini draws this pink
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picture, also according to him the price to be paid would be less 
requlation, more freedom and greater opportunities.
Although the integration of the EC markets promises a huge 
growth rate as seen in the Cecchini study , Internal Market 
Programme has several implications :
II.1.1 Implications & Results of Free Movement of Goods and 
Services
II.1.1.a Monopoly, competition and mergers 
It is a fact that the competition helps finding out the 
cheap>est supplier of a product or service, the best location for a 
firm, the most suitable means of communication or payment, and the 
institutional arrangements most suitable for productivity growth. 
As a result it can be said that the competition is the foundation 
for improving productivity growth.
However the competition in Internal Market in EC means painful 
adjustments for some branches which have a high degree of
protection up to now; in some cases it may even mean a loss of
jobs. This is true for highly-requlated branches, such as 
telecommunications,banking and insurance. Uncompetitive producers 
will lose their protection, so many medium sized national companies 
will disappear under the competitive pressure. So the European 
bussiness sector must take some precautions for the threat of
Japanese and American dominance and must rethink their European 
strategy and organization. So their strategies for the future must 
consider the followings:
- Competition must be interpreted more and more as innovational
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competition and as time competition: speed up innovation and 
shorten the product cycle (12).
- As a new element of competition firms must improve the location 
of production (locational innovation): if firms can not reduce 
costs of old products, they better produce them in low-cost 
locations.
- For taking the advantage of time competition firms must use 
computers and their productivity potential, both for innovations 
and for the decentralization of decision making for routine 
decisions.
- The firms must rethink their organizations according to the 
changing enviroment such as take-overs and mergers. Mergers and 
acquisitions will become a major business in Europe in 1990s.
Although the objective of Internal Market is greater 
efficiency,which is beneficial to both producers and costumers, it 
is essential that those developments should not lead to monopoly 
and anti-competitive situations. Because monopoly will be 
detrimental to consumers, to industrial efficiency, to innovation 
and ultimately to the producers themselves so the Treaty must give 
substantial power to deal with anti-competitive action (21). For 
example the US and Japan firms will have a big advantage over their 
fragmented European comp>etitors with their well developed high-tech 
industries and their large home markets. If the barriers on the 
mobility of goods and services are released, the Japanese and 
American firms can easily enter this competitive market, and they 
can terminate the jobs of the fragmanted small European firms . So 
the new entrants will get a chance of forming monopolies in the
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European market. Therefore it will be necessary to protect these 
relatively weak Europeans until they become competitive by mergers 
and alliances. But such policies will cause another problem because 
such a protective umbrella usually provides an excuse for the 
slowness of the economic growth.
In the medium term both the private and public consumers will 
profit from cost reduction as a result of economies of scale and 
productivity growth. As the internal European market will be much 
larger than the US market and about 3 times the size of Japanese 
market, the production and innovation methods will be put on a 
broader basis and their acceleration will greatly improve the 
competitive power of European enterprices.
Il.l.l.b Taxation
Taxation is the one of the main factors that influence 
competitive position. After the elimination of border restrictions, 
in order to avoid from a chaos, a parallel harmonization of 
consumption taxes (VAT, luxury, etc.) is needed. Most governments 
are in favor of this harmonization because they are afraid of tax 
competition as a form of locational competition. Firms are likely 
to become multinational and they want to shift the tax base and 
even the locus of production to countries with lower profit taxes. 
But, this change is politically very diffucult because this means a 
further erosion of fiscal soverenity of Member Governments.
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II.1.2 Implications & Results of Free Capital Movement
Liberalization of capital movements is a prerequisite 
condition for the establishment of the Internal Market. DELORS 
Committee's plan is to launch the first stage on July 1,1990 {the 
only date mentioned in the report) when all the barriers to capital 
flows will be completely relaxed (11).
There are two views on the liberalization of capital movements 
within the EEC: The pessimistic view is that, any significant 
process toward free mobility of capital would facilitate large 
scale destabilizing capital movements, which disappoints the 
efforts to maintain exchange rate stability (17). For example a 
country facing a large capital outflow may experience a sharp 
increase in its domestic interest rates under a fixed exchange rate 
system. The only posibility for a country trying to avoid large 
fluctuations in its interest rates in the absence of capital 
controls would be to devalue or revalue its currency. This is 
against the purpose of the fixed exchange rate system. 
Consequently, the fear is whether the countries would frequently 
realign the value of their currencies just for avoiding large 
interest rate differentials after removing the capital controls.
The second one is the DELORS Committee’s optimistic view. They 
think that the liberalization of capital movements would increase 
the pressure on the member countries to adopt compatible economic 
policies which will lead to convergent economic developments. By 
freeing the capital movements they also expect an optimum 
allocation of sources hence contribution to the employment growth. 
This large financial area will not only improve the allocation of
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resources between member countries but also increase the 
competiton between financial institutions. The large capital market 
will attract investors, borrowers, depositors (from outside the EC 
too) and part of the less integrated and less regulated Euromarket. 
All these will stimulate savings and investment. The financial 
integration has several effects and implications on financial 
services and banking sector:
* The most important effect of financial integration will be the 
increased competition in financial markets. This will provide 
consumers a wide range of products at lower prices ;
* With the free banking establishment, savers or borrowers 
unsatisfied with conditions offered by domestic banks will be free 
to place their savings to other foreign banks or to borrow from 
abroad. They will also be able to do that in domestic or in foreign 
currency ;
* An authorized bank will be able to carry out the full range of 
banking activities through branches in all Member States whether or 
not these activities are allowed in the host country which will 
force the European banking industry to major structural 
changes (12) ;
The structural changes in banking industry will result in 
greater availability of financial products, lower prices, increased 
innovation and a different topography of the banking industry ;
* The open financial market and the lifted regulations also force 
the innovations in finance because the banks will choose to take 
the opportunities of the huge market by their new technologies ;
* The banks will react to this tough competition by cutting costs.
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abandoning some traditional activities and expanding into new ones. 
Most mergers will take place among small and medium-sized 
institutions. Larger banks will aquire financial institutions 
outside of their traditional lines. Particularly saving banks, 
regional banks and their superstructure will have to be 
reorganized (20).
Because of the above reasons the European financial industry 
is reviewing costs, products and prices in order to prepare for 
1992 and to be able to survive.
In the light of the above discussions, banks will spread over 
Europe with their newly established branches; national currency 
will be less dominating; the payments and clearing system will 
become more European as there will be a strong increase in payments 
across borders; and the size and organization will be adapted to a 
larger and a more complex market.
II.2 The European Central Bank
European Central Bank will form an essential part of the EMU. 
Within the EMU it will be the duty of the European Central Bank to 
issue a joint currency, implement an independent monetary policy 
and as it is stated in DELORS Report to ensure the price stability. 
These are the fundamental characteristics of central banks. 
Experience has shown that there is a reliable correlation between 
(a) the central bank's dependence to the finance ministry and (b) 
the country's inflation rate (7). As long as a country's central 
bank depends to the finance ministry, the inflation rate in that 
country will be higher. The reason of the success of the low
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inflation rates in EMS is the independence of Bundesbank ( Central 
Bank Of Germany which had the greatest role in the EMS ) from the 
government.
The DELORS Report suggests a federal structure which will 
mean that governors of the central banks will form the ESCB 
Council, together with the members of the Board by the European 
Council. Such a structure will be ineffective in adopting and 
implementing joint monetary policy decisions by the ESCB because 
the logic behind the federal structure is to avoid the formulation 
of a Community central bank and continuation of the national 
central banks’ legal independency. Also it is a fact that some 
goveners are dependent on their finance ministry. So there is a 
fear that the European Central Bank would be tolerant to inflation 
and the divergent inflation rates of member countries would disturb 
the price stability in the Community.
The monetary policy cannot be decided federally and 
regionally as DELORS Report suggests, so as an alternative solution 
the ESCB should operate only at one level for taking decisions and 
implementing them. This is the way other central banks with a 
federal system operate so Community countries' central banks would 
become the ESCB's executive organs. Also in order to make their job 
easier, ESCB Council can transfer important tasks such as, open 
market operations or intervention on the money or foreign-currency 
markets, to some of the central banks. However, there must be a 
statute which bound the national central banks by the ESCB’s 
instructions in the final stage of EMU.
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II.2.1 Key Role Of Price Stability
As it was stated in the above section one of the duties of the 
European Central Bank is to ensure the price stability. This is an 
important task which have a key role in an Economic and Monetary 
Union for a number of reasons:
- Price stability is an important prerequisite for economic growth 
and attainment of a low level of unemployment ;
- If price stability is maintained to some extent, the major 
incentive for speculation on currency revaluations and devaluations 
will be eliminated ;
- Stable currency relations within the Community will make the 
Community an attractive capital market worldwide ;
- Price stability has also a contribution to social progress among 
EC countries . The reasons for that statement is briefly discussed 
below :
Price stability means that the price (in terms of an arbitrary 
currency) of a certain good will be the same in all the member 
countries. It is an emprical fact that the higher the rate of 
inflation, the more volatile and unpredictable the prices.
Volatility of prices deteriorates the price stability which also 
leads to speculative profit opportunities among countries. So it 
can be said that the price stability" as maintained with low rates 
of inflation. In a situation of unpredictable prices, the consumer 
invests all its money to products and goods with the fear of more 
expensive prices in a small period of time (no savings). On the 
countrary price stability encourages the savings because the
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consumer will predict the price easily and make his decision 
accordingly whether buying or saving.As a result, the commitment to 
price stability will also be a great social benefit because the 
savings and earnings of low-income groups will not be eroded by 
inflation.
Due to the reasons stated above price stability is an 
important prerequisite for the European Monetary and Economic 
Union. In EMS the consumer price growth rates are given in the 
following table :
TABLE 1
CONSUMER PRICE GROWTH RATES
1986 1987 1988 1989-19«
EC 3.08 2.58 2.95 3.64
Belgium 1.28 1.55 2.48 4.50
Denmark 3.62 4.08 2.89 1.51
France 2.53 3.25 2.43 3.36
Germany -0.25 0.27 1.29 2.65
Ireland 3.81 3.75 2.90 3.07
Netherlands 0.16 -0.50 0.91 2.61
Italy 5.85 4.75 4.72 4.28
Spain 8.76 4.80 3.44 4.30
Un. Kingdom 3.42 4.15 4.16 4.51
Portugal 11.75 9.35 8.32 8.08
Greece 23.02 16.36 14.99 12.61
U.S 1.92 3.66 4.00 4.27
Japan 0.61 0.11 1.19 2.60
Source: European Affairs
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It is seen in the table that except Portugal and Greece the 
consumer price growth rates are low and convergent to each other 
and more convergent rates are expected in the future. These low 
and convergent figures shows the success of the EMS in maintaining 
price stability.
In the case of price stability, EMU would take the advantages 
of it such that small savers will not suffer socially due to 
the considerable losses in purchasing power. Collective bargaining 
will also be made easier since "compensation for inflation" will no 
longer have to be included in wage negotiations, and all countries 
of the Community will become equally attractive targets for 
investment capital. A monetary union commited to price stability 
will thus make it easier to raise capital on the international 
markets for structural and regional development projects. It would 
also help the Community to be in a better condition according to 
the currencies which have dominated the international monetary 
system in the past (in particular the US dollar) .
In order to enjoy the above mentioned advantages of the price 
stability the European Central Bank must strictly ensure the price 
stability which will control the inflation rate.
II.3 The ECU
II.3.1 The ECU : As a Common Currency
In the last stage, the DELORS Committee proposes the 
introduction of ECU as a single common EEC currency. The
implications, and pros and cons of a single common currency is
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given below:
* With exchange rates permanently fixed, international competition 
between producers should then bring the prices of traded goods into 
line .
* The fixity of exchange rates put an added strain on traditional 
”weak-currency" countries such as France and Italy. They have used 
occasional realignments { devaluations of franc and lira against 
the DM ) to maintain their international competitiveness. Under 
the condition of fixity they would have had to keep domestic costs 
and prices under tighter control to stay competitive at their EMS 
exchange rates. It would be politically as well as economically 
difficult. This fear is intense for the three remaining outsiders 
Spain, Grece, Portugal. These are high-inflation countries which 
are to be let in later on after some economical improvements (15).
* Citizens of the Member States will be given the opportunity to 
travel all over Europe without being penalized by the cost of 
converting their cash into local currency every time. ( Today 
a traveller landing off from Britain with 1000 pound to visit each 
of the EEC countries, converting his money into the local 
currencies of each country without buying anything, would arrive 
back with only 500 pounds in his pocket (9).)
* The common currency would promote the European savings. The 
the volume of savings in Europe is as large as American plus 
Japanese savings. Therefore Europe has the opportunity of financing 
investments on the scale of the unified domestic market and 
establishing a strong capital market.
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* At the level of small companies, the need for a common currency 
is increased because their business volume is too small to amortize 
the structural costs generated by foreign exchange maageraent at the 
administrative, financial, accounting and sales levels.
* The single common currency will contribute to the progress of 
EMU by attracting investment from the third countries because a 
continental market which has no exchange risks, no restrictions on 
capital movements and free bank financial services will be an 
attractive location for investors from third countries.
* Economic and Monetary Union would give the Community greater 
power internationally. The ECU as an investment and reserve 
currency would be able to compete better with the dollar and the 
yen than any other European currency today. A Community speaking 
with one voice could play a greater role in the world monetary 
system, in international organizations such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (lA).
II.3.2 The ECU : Its Private Usage
In Point 49 it is suggested that the private use of the ECU 
should not be restricted. But this is not enough, in fact the 
private use of ECU should be encouraged to an even greater extent 
because of its insufficient usage. This will help shifting to a 
common currency more easily. The main reasons for insufficient 
private use of ECU can be summarized as follows:
* Insufficient knowledge of the ECU :
Mostly small and medium-sized companies have not enough 
knowledge about the benefits of ECU although those are the firms
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that mostly gain from elimination of the unnecessary costs stemming 
from the multiplicy of currencies used in transactions.
■ Habitual behavior :
This is the problem that was experienced by French while 
imposing the New Franc. No secrerary has 'ECU’ symbols on her 
typewriter and every treasurer is used to talking in dollar terms.
* The ECU's uncertain future :
Many companies still wonder about the ECU's future. This 
uncertainty is very harmful in ECU's development because it 
constitutes a wait-and-see attitute in the business enviroment.
* The competitiveness of other currencies :
Naturally the companies that invoice in hard currencies and 
purchase in weaker ones does not want to shift to a single currency.
The support to the private use of ECU can be given by 
permiting ECU for the payments of taxes and for the use in 
corporate balance sheets and accounts. The use of the ECU for 
balance sheets, for statistics, and for additional price indication 
would also make the ECU known and demostrate its advantages. This 
would enable Community citizens to compare prices and get used to a 
"European" money. It will help also people to be get used to 
handling monetary units in terms of ECU.
Moreover, after fixing the exchange rates the ECU will be 
fundemantally different in its character than the ECU today which 
is a basket type of currency. The absolute prerequsite of such a 
move, shifting to a common currency, was being a strong currency, 
its name was of secondary importance. Therefore prior to the 
introduction of ECU as a common currency, it should be as strong as
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th© strongsst national currsncy unit in the European Community.
II.3.3 The ECU : As a Parallel Currency
It is very natural for a full monetary union to speak of one 
currency because all the existing monies become the perfect 
substitutes. At this extreme it would be meaningless to speak of a 
'•parallel" currency since any parallel currency would be 
indistinguishable from national currencies. The concept of a 
parallel currency becomes meaningful only in an intermediate stage 
of monetary union when different monies are not perfect substitutes 
because of transaction costs and exchange rate expectations. In 
order to be successful, the parallel currency is expected to have a 
widespread use among national currencies. This condition is only 
satisfied under a high degree of monetary integration. If the 
parallel currency is initially used by a few people, this will not 
only contribute nothing but it will damage the monetary union also.
It is a correct action to put restrictions on the European 
parallel currency, as expressed in the DELORS Report (Point47), 
which would be additional to the Community currencies and compete 
with them to a certain extent. The drawbacks of the parallel 
currency are given below:
- This additional currency would also generate some additional 
money and credit which would adversely effect the efforts to 
achieve greater price stability ;
- The risks and hazards of a parallel currency is more than the 
possible benefits of the expected acceleration of process towards 
monetary union ;
- A parallel currency would also do nothing to enhance the common 
ECU-currency which would be introduced at stage 3. GRESHAM'S law
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would apply i.e. such a parallel currency would tend to either 
drive out national currencies or to be driven out by them, 
depending on whether it was looked on as relatively "good" or 
"bad".
II.4 Political Will
As a matter of fact, the nature of a monetary union strongly 
suggests that the regions or countries involved must have some 
common political interests and/or a willingness to adopt fiscal and 
monetary policies consistent with those of the other countries in 
the union (2).
Although substantial progress has been made, the process of 
integration has needed a lot more effort. Greater convergence of 
economic performance is needed. Although there was a downward 
trend in the average rate of price and wage inflation, considerable 
national differences still exist. There are also still notable 
discrepancies in budgetary positions, growth rates, and external 
imbalances which can be observed from Tables 2 and 3. The 
existence of these disequilibria indicate that there are the areas 
where economic performances will have to be made more convergent 
(PointlO-11).
Point 12 in DELORS Report indicates that the full freedom of 
capital movements and integrated financial markets incompatible 
with national policies would quickly translate into exchange rate 
tension and put a burden on monetary policy. So the integration 
process thus requires more intensive and effective policy 
coordination. This integration process can be done even within the
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TABLE 2
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES
EC
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Ireland
NetherlandB
Italy
Spain
Un. Kingdom
Portugal
Greece
1986
49.9
3.7 
-4.3
3.0 
37.7 
-0.4
3.8 
4.3 
4.2
-1.4
1.1
-1.7
U.S -141.4
Japan 85.8
Source: European Affairs
1987
34.0
1.9
-4.2
-4.6
41.8
0.0
2.3
0.0
1.3 
-3.5
0.3
-1.3
-164.8
86.7
1988
22.4
2.7
-2.9
0.9
30.5 
0.3 
2.3 
0.3
- 0 . 6
-9.1
- 0.2
-1.7
•144.4
74.6
1989-1993
13.2
1.0
-2.5
1.8
20.7
- 0.0
1.3
-2.9
0.3
-5.2
0.0
-1.4
-148.3
56.9
TABLE 3
REAL GDP GROWTH RATES
(percentages 1980 prices & 1980 exchange rates)
1986 1987 1988 1989-1993
EC 2.56 2.42 2.29 2.30
Belgium 2.40 1.70 2.41 1.48
Denmark 3.42 -0.70 0.09 2.32
France 2.11 2.08 1.95 2.51
Germany 2.58 1.75 1.60 1.82
Ireland -0.30 3.40 1.07 3.32
Netherlands 2.50 1.10 2.01 1.74
Italy 2.47 2.70 2.69 2.35
Spain 2.98 5.00 4.14 3.78
Un. Kingdom 3.01 3.66 3.14 2.36
Portugal 4.30 5.00 3.44 2.92
Greece 1.40 -0.60 0.84 2.40
U.S 3.14 3.12 2.72 2.68
Japan 2.40 3.90 3.58 3.17
Source: European Affairs
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framework of the present exchange rate arrangements but also in 
areas of national economic management affecting aggregate demand, 
prices and cost of production.
The process of transfer of economic and monetary powers which 
will be made to the Community is still a very important question 
for the member states. One difficulty here is that the Community
bodies have not yet discussed to what extent irrevocable exchange 
rates or even a single Community currency will make it necessary to 
transfer powers and decision-making to the Community. So a broad 
political approval is needed to achive EMU. In the case of Britain, 
Margaret Thatcher insists on minimum transfer of sovereignty {10). 
But she must see the fact that in today's world the increased 
capacity in international action will lead to a wide-ranging shift 
of responsibilities from national to the supranational level. For 
example the control of the pollution of the environment, the water 
quality of rivers, the health of forests, the purity of air can no 
longer be controlled by a single country. Due to the growing 
interdependence of international financial markets, no state is 
autonomous in its monetary and financial policies. The conditions 
under which a country can sell its products and purchase
commodities on the international markets are no longer adjusted by 
itself alone. In an age of growing interdependence and
globalization, every nation is in effect constantly losing 
its sovereignity (19). The extent of this transfer of powers to 
Community bodies (such as the Council of Ministers and the European 
System of Central Banks) is of key importance for the political 
approval of Economic and Monetary Union. Therefore the member
A2
ststss should nsgotiat© bsfore a binding decision is reached on the 
final stage of EMU.
II.5 Budget Policy : No Inflation Deficit Financing
The DELORS Report proposes that EMU members have to set 
"binding limits" on each other's fiscal deficits. Now suppose that 
a country in the union is faced by a temporary economic shock that 
makes its products less competitive. Moreover its market forces are 
weak to reduce its prices quickly down in response. So the demand 
will fall and the country's economy may go into a recession. It 
can not use monetary policy (due to the common monetary policy in 
union) to stimulate the demand. However it can use fiscal policy. 
In order to stimulate the private demand, the government must 
borrow and spend more than it collects from taxes, but here the 
problem is "binding limits”. The DELORS Committee is also right 
that such policies like budget deficit financing may build up 
inflationary pressures which will risk inflation rate compatibility 
among EC countries. But it should not be forgoten that the proper 
use of fiscal policy is a shock absorber instead of triggering the 
inflation. Perhaps in some cases the monetary union will be upset 
by economic shocks that effects its members in different degrees,so 
putting such binding limits is not reasonable. Also the binding 
rules for upper limits on budget deficits and the definition of 
aggregate budgetary balances does not seem to be necessary because 
the adoption of such rules by Council of Ministers would be in 
conflict with the basic democratic budgetary rights of the Member 
State parliaments (8).
4 3
It is a clear fact that public and social budgets have a 
significant influence on Member States' economic and social 
policies. They influence individual Member States* wage policies 
and they determine the level and quality of a large number of 
community services, so full-scale budgetary-policy co-operation is 
therefore needed to ensure that existing imbalances do not 
deteriorate any further (3).
II.6 Structural Funds
After the completion of EMU it will no longer be possible for 
the Member States to regain their competitiveness and economic 
advantages of their geographic locations by adjusting their 
exchange rates (4). Prosperity in the Community is measured in 
terms of per-capita income. In EC the per-capita income varies by 
as much as 6:1 between the richer and the poorer regions. This gap 
will be even more obvious in a single monetary area after which 
wages and salaries as well as prices will be able to be compared in 
the same currency in all Member States.
In February 1988 the European Council decided that the 
structural funds were to be doubled by 1993, so it can be said 
that a new form of partnership was to be established between the 
Community and its less developed regions. It is a reasonable idea 
which is stated in DELORS Report (point29) that the principal 
objective of regional policy should not be to subsidize incomes and 
to offset inequalities in standards of living but improving 
infrastructure because it prevents the large-scale migration of 
labour from becoming the major adjustment factor.
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11.7 Regional Policy and Capital Market
Some improvement can be expected for structurally 
disadvantaged and economically less developed regions after the EC 
structural funds will be doubled. Due to the variation of interest 
rates from region to region in EC, the less developed areas will 
become more attractive for private investors after the
liberalization of capital movements. So less-developed areas can 
take the advantage of the comparative cost and would attract the 
capital for investment. Also the differences in purchasing power 
can be exploited by investors to a greater degree too. If the 
interest rates of member countries are same it will be possible to 
use the EC funds to a greater extent for capital and interest 
subsidies so that more resources can be mobilized for projects 
contributing to the development of less-developed areas (9). As a 
result, the liberalization of capital market would automatically 
support the regional policy which is proposed by DELORS Committee.
11.8 Monetarist and Economist Parallelism
According to the DELORS Report (see Point 21) parallelism 
means that economic union and monetary union would have to be 
implemented in parallel. Also it is a fact that monetary union is 
only logical if it goes hand-in-hand with a high degree of economic 
convergence. In EC due to the new entrants and the divergence in 
economic indicators of the participating countries it will be 
difficult for the common monetary policy and a convergent economic 
policy to advance in parallel as long as the monetary policy and 
economic and fiscal policies differ from country to country. In the
4 5
case of the lack of parallelism, tensions may arise between 
monetary policy on the one hand, and economic and fiscal policies 
on the other hand. Here it should be recalled that, the more 
economic policy is compatible with the price stability objective, 
the easier it will be to achieve parallelism at Community level(8).
11.9 EMU : With Some Or All Member States Participated
Some of the member States (due to their high degree of 
convergence) which are not likely to adjust the exchange rates any 
more (a point already reached by some EMS members like Germany) 
should be able to launch the EMU as a stable monetary area and 
ready to transfer the agreed sovereignty rights to it. But new 
members (like Greece, Spain, Portugal) might not be capable of 
completing the transition of Economic and Monetary Union 
simultaneously, because they may still need to adjust their 
exchange rates. The DELORS Report do not consider these new 
members,so the three stage proposal may work for some countries but 
not for all of them.
Besides these new member countries, the DELORS Commitee also 
forgot to consider the non-member countries. According to Treaties 
of Rome, the Community is open to all democratic European states 
which accept all the rights and obligations attached to membership 
and which accept the political goal of the unification process. But 
these non-member countries would undoubtedly create certain 
institutional problems for EMU, particularly in connection with 
Community institutions such as the Council of Ministers and 
European Parliament. For the countries whose full membership is
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pending, it should be better to force these volunteer countries by 
giving an observer status with limited voting rights within the 
ESCB.
II. 10 Preparatory Period : no three-stage system
It seems inappropriate to schedule all the steps in advance 
in a three-phase plan as the DELORS Report does. It would be easier 
to reach political agreement beforehand on a treaty laying down the 
conditions for the final stage of EMU provided that no commitments 
are made to transfer powers to the European Communities on fixed 
dates (8). The fate of the 1971 WERNER plan shows that publicly 
announcing the stages of a plan and then subsequently cancelling 
them can have a detrimental effect on the complicated and delicate 
preparations for monetary union.
It would therefore be more realistic to speak of a preparatory 
period, which would certainly extend more than three or four years 
beyond the completion date of the internal market. After a short 
start-up period the actual integration process of Economic and 
Monetary Union could follow immediately. Therefore the steps 
assigned to the second stage in the DELORS Report would thus have 
to be switched to the preparatory period (8).
II.11 Social Aspects
The DELORS Report does not give sufficient consideration to 
the various social aspects since they believe that social 
dimensions of Economic and Monetary Union can be carefully examined 
in the future. But with this logic they create a workshop rather
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than a real Community. Working people do not understand the 
structural changes in the Internal Market. After the creation of 
the Internal Market, it is estimated that there could be 40% 
reduction in the total number of firms operating in the Community 
but a doubling in the size of those which are left. This means many 
workers are fired and many of them are hired . It is a key issue 
that there must some European standarts concerning the information, 
consultation and negotiation rights of working people (14).
Besides the integration of economic and monetary issues there 
should be also an integration in social issues. For example if the 
German economy can support good retirement pensions, or if the 
French economy can support good family allowances why should not 
the other governments do the same. As a result it is vital that 
social developments throughout the Community should be in phase 
with economic and monetary integration . By this way Europeans 
would reach to a real Community.
AS
CONCLUSION
The monetary union in Europe can be successful if the 
necessary conditions are satisfied and the correct actions are 
implemented for the further steps in the future. The prerequisite 
conditions for a monetary and economic union are exchange rate 
stability, economic convergence, establishment of a single market 
(within which persons, goods, services and capital can move freely) 
and willingness to adopt fiscal and monetary policies consistent 
with those of other countries in the union. These conditions have 
already been met or will be met in July, 1,1990 for European
Economic and Monetary Union. Now, for the future steps it is
important to implement the correct action without any mistake, (i.e 
how it is done?) Delors Committee proposes a new Economic and 
Monetary Union in three successive stages but it seems inapropriate 
to schedule all the steps in advance in three phase plan as DELORS 
Report does. It is a mistake of the DELORS Committee to define
later phases of European Monetary and Economic Union prior to
gaining experience from the implementation of the previous phases. 
No one can forsee how will the world look like in 3 or 5 years. 
Even Mr.Delors didn’t forsee 1 year later, what happens now if the 
German unification is realised?,or what happens now to those Varsow 
Pact Countries? Therefore it would be more realistic to speak of a 
preparatory period which would certainly extend more than three or 
four years beyond the completion of the internal market, and to 
give the correct decisions when the time has come.
If the European Economic and Monetary Union is to be 
established properly with a common monetary policy, with a single
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currency (ECU) under the control of ESCB and a maximum coherence 
between the national economic policies, then the Community will 
enjoy with a better economic performance, better intra-community 
trade and optimal allocation of production factors. The 
establishment of an economic and monetary union would give also the 
Community a greater authority in international negotiations and 
enhance its capacity to a level which will be able to influence 
economic relations between industrial and developing countries.
The European Union will strengthen feelings of European 
solidarity and the sense of a European identity. Those who work 
closely together, abolish barriers which separates people, 
products, services and capital, pays their bill with a common 
currency, make their economic and foreign policy jointly and carry 
subregional or local cooperation beyond national borders, will also 
develop a feeling of solidarity with one another .In the end every 
Frenchman or Italian or a Turc ( after being a full membership to 
EC) can also be a European, just as every Bavarian and every Lower 
Saxon is also a German.
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